









The evolution of the student as a customer in 







In 2014, the Australian Federal Government attempted to de-
regulate higher education fees so as to allow universities to set 
their own tuition fees. The associated public debate offer critical 
insights into how the identity of a student as a ‘customer’ of higher 
education is understood and deployed when developing higher 
education policy. This paper uses the 2014 Australian higher 
education reforms as a lens through which to further scholarly 
research into the student-as-customer metaphor and to see how it 
is influenced by the perceptions and understandings of policy actors 
external to the higher education sector. These include politicians, 
special interest groups, the students and their parents and 
prospective employers. This study reveals that the public/private 
nexus—both of funding and benefit— problematizes traditional 
conceptualisations of students and others as higher edu- cation 
customers. In turn, this restricts the ability or desire of policy 
actors to describe how the student functions as a customer as a 
consequence of market reform. This inability compromises the 




The idea of higher education students as being customers has been 
and continues to be well-researched in scholarly literature (cf. 
George 2007; Redding 2005; Vander Schee 2010). However, 
studies generally focus on perceptions and interactions within 






2000), the students view themselves (Saunders 2014; White 2007) 
or more theoretical considerations  of how  the  student-as-
customer  notion impacts upon understandings of what it means 
to be a university (O’Byrne and Bond 2014). Greater attention 
needs to be paid to how the idea of student-as-customer extends 
outside the higher education sector and is understood by 
diverse stakeholders, including government, special interest 
groups and the wider community. This is important because in 
developed, democratic nation states, it is these wider perceptions 
that influence public policy; more so than advocates within the 
sector itself. In the case of public universities especially, it is what 
officials within government—and by extension the citizens they 
represent—choose to do in regards to public policy that ultimately 
matters (Kraft and Furlong 2007). 
A prime example was the attempt in 2014 to reform the 
Australian higher education sector. Central to the proposed reform 
package was a plan to de-regulate domestic student tuition fees by 
removing the maximum cap on these fees, thus allowing 
universities to charge what they considered to be a market price for 
higher education. The reforms were proposed in May 2014, 
debated throughout the year and finally voted down by the 
Australian Senate in March 2015; although at the time this paper 
was written the issue remained technically live in Australian 
higher education policy. The Senate’s rejection of the reforms 
was despite the almost unanimous support of the universities’ vice 
chancellors. They and their institution’s secretariats argued 
forcefully for sectoral reform; particularly for a recalibration of the 
balance between public and private investment in a student’s 
education. The representations made from the within the sector 
were considered through a Senate inquiry that ran through the 
second half of 2014 and reported in early 2015. This was a public 
inquiry and so the Senate also considered submissions from 
diverse stakeholders including student unions; professional bodies 
relying on a graduate workforce; social welfare organisations; 
private higher education providers; students; parents of students 
and individual citizens. This public discussion of education, 
 
 
markets and customers provides a critical insight into how the 
Australian higher education sector is positioned to operate in an 
increasingly competitive and globalised market environment. 
The submissions to the public inquiry (more than 160), plus 
associated commentary, provide most of the data for this paper. 
Their analysis here has been guided by critical discourse analysis 
(CDA), since it explores the connection between the use of 
language and the social and political context within which it 
occurs (Paltridge 2013). In line with such an approach, the analysis 
begins with the assumption that language use is always social 
and discourse both reflects and produces particular ideologies 
(Paltridge 2013). CDA is a useful tool for exploring a particular issue 
and here the issue is the identity of a student as a customer. In 
constructing these identities the authors of the texts choose 
words and represen- tations deliberately, even if they are not 
consciously aware that they do so. Consequently, CDA is a means 
by which the intersection of social theories and linguistics can be 
examined. In the field of education research, it can be usefully 
employed as a means of answering questions about the 
relationships between language and society; specifically in regards 
to how education plays a part (Rogers et al. 2005). Furthermore, 
given its focus on social power relations, CDA is a useful means of 
analysing how certain groups of students might be advantaged over 
others, as the identity of them as a customer is interpreted. Higher 
education equity is a key consideration in the construction of 
contemporary public policy since its emergence within policy 
agendas in Western societies since the early 1970s, as they started 
to massify (Martin 2009). 
 
 
An overview of the international massification of higher 
education 
 
In line with a theory of massification proposed by Martin Trow in 
the 1960s and based upon the US experience (Trow 1970), 
international higher education sectors have generally transitioned 
from the elite stage (\15 % of the population with tertiary 
 
 
qualifications), into the mass stage and continuing towards 
theoretical universal access (50 % of the population and beyond). 
Early stages of growth are characterised by a focus on building new 
public institutions, followed by a period of steady growth before 
concerted efforts are made to markedly increase expansion (cf. King 
and James 2013). Generally, the early stages of development and 
incremental growth are financed by public funds, such as the 
taxpayer-funded tuition fees and maintenance grants in the UK in 
the 1960s and their equivalent in Australia, the Commonwealth 
scholarships. Public funds have also been used elsewhere to spur 
more significant expansion, as occurred in the US with the 
introduction of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (the G.I. 
Bill). However, in many cases, at a certain point the capacity of the 
public purse to support growth in enrolments is perceived to be 
insufficient, requiring greater private investment in public 
universities to maintain the sector’s continued expansion. The use of  
income- contingent students loans, such as in the UK and Australia 
have been implemented as a relatively low-cost (to the student) 
option of subsidising public financing. In other countries, such as 
the US, expansion has been supported by a range of grants, 
scholarships and federal and state subsidies to public institutions; 
all of which defray student costs to varying degrees. Tuition-free 
education is still provided in other countries with mass higher 
education systems; most notably the Scandinavian kingdoms of 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden. However, even in countries where 
public education remains tuition-free, the issue of public cost is 
often an ongoing concern. For example the introduction of tuition 
fees in Germany in 2005 was with the support of the majority of 
political and institutional actors (Kehm 2006); however, following 
significant stakeholder opposition the fees were gradually phased 
out, one state (Lä nder) at a time until by 2014 higher education 
was once again universally free. 
Based on current trends in graduation rates, 39 % of today’s 
young adults on average across OECD countries are expected to 
attain university-level education during their lifetime. In one-third 
of OECD countries with available data, public institutions charge 
annual tuition fees in excess of USD 1500 for national students. 
 
 
OECD countries spend on average 1.6 % of their GDP on tertiary 
education (OECD 2014). For many scholars this evidences a 
neoliberal pattern of state ‘versus’ institution and states ‘versus’ 
markets, since the trend is to shift the cost to the consumer and 
position higher education as a marketplace. Countries are classified 
on a continuum between state and market control, in the sense that 
the less there is of the former, the more higher education is 
represented as a market and the student as a consumer 
(Marginson and Rhoades 2002). However, such representations 
significantly underplay the significance of diverse social and cultural 
forces, just at the national but local and international level 
(Marginson and Rhoades 2002). They also misrepresent a nation’s 
higher education sector and its students as a homogenous entity, 
which is not the case. Generally speaking there are four main 
market segments within a country’s higher education system: 
domestic students receiving a free or subsidised education; full-fee-
paying domestic students; free or subsidised international students 
and full-fee-paying international students. Finally, most higher 
education systems are an amalgam of public and private institution 
or even hybrids of the two. 
 
 
Australia’s higher education sector 
 
In Australia, the largest market segment comprises subsidised 
(mostly undergrad- uate) domestic students. Domestic refers 
primarily to Australian citizens but includes permanent visa holders 
and New Zealand citizens. These students account for around 60 % 
of all student load (Department of Education and Training 2014). 
Domestic undergraduate students receive a significant public 
investment in their education, known as the Higher Education 
Contribution Scheme (HECS). Whilst the term HECS is often used 
to describe the overall public investment it actually comprises two 
key elements, which need to be considered in isolation. The first is 
the provision by the Commonwealth to the university of a subsidy to 
the cost of the student’s degree, which reduces the private 
investment required to be paid by this student. The second element 
 
 
is the provision to the student of an income-contingent loan scheme 
(ICLS), should he/she not be willing or able to pay his/her 
contribution up front. The ICLS allows the student to pay off his/her 
student debt over a flexible time period and with a below-market 
interest rate. The initial ICLS scheme, known as HECS, was 
implemented in 1989 and had a flat, $1800 rate of contribution with 
no flexibility (Jackson 2000). Over the next quarter of a century, a 
series of amendments were made to the legislation, which resulted 
in some further flexibility in setting fees, but overall had the 
effect of decreasing the proportional public (Commonwealth) 
investment, and increasing the proportional private (student) 
investment, so that by 2013 the ratio was approximately 60–40 
public to private investment. There is also a full-fee domestic 
student market in Australia, mostly in postgraduate courses, 
meaning that for these courses universities can and do charge 
commercial rates. The ability to charge postgraduate students full 
fees in limited courses was introduced as part of the 1989 higher 
education reforms and over time this capacity has been increased. 
Today, full-fee-paying domestic students account for approximately 
10 % of the market. Most domestic full-fee-paying students also 
have access to the ICLS. International students make up 
approximately 25 % of the Australian higher education market. Prior 
to 1989, access for international students was generally provided 
through foreign aid programs and was viewed as a social, not 
economic, goal. However the 1989 reforms repositioned 
international students as a source of significant income for 
Australian universities. International student numbers grew from 
24,998 in 1990 to 210,397 in 2003 (Marginson 1995) and then to 
347,560 in 2014 (Department of Education and Training 2014). 
In general, international students are charged market rates and do 
not have access to an ICLS. Prior to 2012, market supply for 
domestic and international fee-paying students was, broadly 
speaking, dictated by market forces. Subsidised domestic student 
places  were  however  capped,  allowing  the  Government  to  
control  public expenditure  to  a  large  degree.  However,  in  
2012  a  centre-socialist  Labor Government uncapped the supply 
of these places, creating a wider demand-driven system of the 
 
 
public funding of higher education. Prior to the proposed 2014 
reforms therefore, the Australian higher education sector had 
matured to the point where it had distinct market segments, each 
driven by related but separate forces and logics. Overall, the 
sector has been characterised as adopting a New Public 
Management  model  of  marketisation,  combining  as  it  did  
neoliberal  business models and market templates, yet with an 
emphasis on audit and accountability, transparency and 
individuation (Marginson 2013). It was in a sense a ‘quasi-market’ by  
its  introduction  of  a  degree  of  monetary  exchange  between  
provider  and customer and greater competition, not only 
between providers but also between customers (Marginson 1995). 
Yet two key conditions for a classical market—the freedom for 
institutions to set prices and the expectation that the student pay 
the full cost of their education (Onderwijsraad 2001, as cited in 
Jongbloed 2003)—were largely absent. 
In 2013, a newly elected centre-right Coalition Government 
initiated a funding review of the higher education sector and in 
2014 announced it was proposing to significantly reduce the state 
subsidy. To offset this fiscal loss to the universities, a deregulation 
of the student contribution amount was also proposed, leaving it to 
the universities rather than the state to determine the maximum 
cost of a higher education degree. However, the ICLS would 
remain. Thus, the proposed reforms mostly affected the subsidised 
student market and not surprisingly, the bulk of the submissions 
made to the Inquiry focussed on issues relating to domestic, 
undergraduate students. The ensuing debate regarding ‘‘customers’’ 
and ‘‘markets’’ of higher education is contextualised accordingly. 
 
 
Positioning higher education as a market; de-
positioning students as customers 
 
Brown (2010) identifies literature dating back to the 1970s on the 
application of market theory to higher education. Notably, the idea 
that educational qualifications acted as a signal to potential 
employers as to the ability of the job applicant was discussed in 
 
 
length by Spence (1973). Scholarly interest appears concomitant 
with the rise in neoliberal studies; particularly in examining how 
social policy is formulated in societies modelled on economic 
competition of the market (Peters 2007). Writers on the subject 
tend either to be strongly pro or anti in their views, rather than 
balanced (Brown 2010). Beyond theorisation however, the 
application of market  reform  in  higher  education  is  often  
constrained  by  political  factors (Marginson 2013). For example in 
Canada from the 1990s onwards, tuition fees were regulated, 
deregulated, increased and frozen at various times across provinces, 
as politicians attempted to balance economic and social policy 
(Jones and Field 2013). Evidence from the UK, Germany and New 
Zealand indicates that the initial adoption of neoliberal policies is 
often followed by varying degrees of retreat of the same when faced 
by strong public opposition; especially when coupled with 
incidences of global market crisis (cf. Kehm 2006; Humpage 
2015). Thus, the acceptance of the idea of a higher education 
‘market’ is not an automatic sequitur for the acceptance of a user-
pays pricing structure. 
The proposed reforms of 2014 revealed that already there was 
widespread acceptance of an Australian higher education market. 
This occurred primarily through the identification of related sub-
markets such as the postgraduate student market, online student 
market, regional universities market and the international student 
market. There was also much discussion of associated ‘input’ 
markets such as the high-school leaver market, and ‘output’ 
markets such as the labour market. The higher education market 
was positioned as a dynamic entity; one which had evolved to a 
point where policy adopting a supply driven approach was 
becoming increasingly redundant. From this perspective, higher 
education had been for some time a market and by extension 
students represented some form of customer. However, the belief 
that it was desirable to ‘‘create more competition with the public 
universities’’ (Kemp and Norton 2014, p. x) now brought the role of 
student- as-customer into sharper relief. Simultaneously, the review 
argued for dropping the previous government’s 40 % attainment 
bachelor-degree target for 25–34 year-olds by the year 2025 and for 
 
 
a 20 % low socio-economic status student enrolment share by 2020. 
Widening access and participation therefore became a possible 
consequence, rather than a primary intention, of the massification 
of higher education. 
It is axiomatic that a market must be in evidence in order for to 
customers to exist, yet policy discussion surrounding the reforms 
tended to subsume the student- as-customer construct. The 
student was not explicitly described as a customer; rather the 
field into which they entered was presented as a competitive, 
commodifiable market (White 2007). Thus, universities were 
encouraged to compete for students, not customers. Avoiding 
explicit reference of the word ‘‘customer’’ reinforced the idea that, 
in education at least, the term is considered pejorative by many 
(cf. George 2007). When students were explicitly referred to as 
customers, it was invariably used as a tactic by opponents to the 
reforms. As one individual submission to the inquiry observed, the 
proposed Bill would ‘‘turn all higher education providers into 
companies with students as customers, with limited consumer 
rights, rather than making universities places of higher learning 
and knowledge acquisition for the benefit of society as a whole’’ 
(Submission 133, 2014, 
p. 1). Again, the potential effect on policies of equity must be 
considered. Consumer rights are universal and assume a level 
playing field where the power of each consumer is generic. 
Equally generic is the conceptualisation of the consumer him/ 
herself: they are seen to represent or act on behalf of no social 
milieu or aspiration. In contrast, policies of equity are redistributive 
in design, seeking as they do to alter the  social  composition  of  the  
higher  education  sector  are  in  line  with  wider demographics 
(Gale and Tranter 2011; Marginson 2011b). Customers may be more 
or less equal in consumer law but students are not necessarily so in 
regards to public policy. 
Pro-reform discussion also highlighted other stakeholders who 
benefitted from increased competition, further blurring the 
distinction of the student as a customer. In its budget explanatory 
document, the Government also identified the families of students 
as the beneficiaries of the reforms. Increasing competition 
between universities would result, the Minister for Education 
 
 
argued elsewhere, in ‘‘the winners [being] students and the 
parents of students… as competition weaves its magic at 
universities’’ (Heath 2014). Furthermore, reference to a new 
Employer Satisfaction Survey positioned the student as a product 
of the education process, with the future employer as the 
customer demanding satisfaction. This was reinforced elsewhere in 
the budget document by reference to the need for higher 
education providers to ‘‘work together to offer the skills and 
knowledge that local employers are looking for’’ (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2014, p. 6). The idea that universities ‘produced’ graduates 
to keep the state’s economy ‘advancing’ was put forward as a 
fundamental goal of higher education (Pyne 2014a). The state 
itself also functions as a quasi-customer of higher education since 
by part-paying for an individual’s education, it can be equally be 
viewed as part-customer. Furthermore, as a primary benefactor of 
the resulting socio-economic benefits of having a more educated 
population, the state receives a significant service for that payment. 
Without this subsidy, public universities would cease to exist in their 
current form. Alternatively, the state can be considered a market 
investor, in the sense that it seeks a risk-adjusted return in exchange 
for the financing, compared to a specific set of services (Merton 
and Thakor 2015). However the investor analogy is imperfect, 
since the state is seeking more than a risk-adjusted return. It is also 
seeking graduates in specific fields of study, enrolments from 
students from disadvantaged backgrounds and support for a mass, 
comprehensive system of higher education. Like a customer 
therefore, the state is also seeking specific services from the 
market. 
There were in fact three representations of the relationship 
between the student and the market throughout submissions. The 
first representation, described above, positioned the student as 
external to the market in the sense that the service and service 
provider already existed, regardless of whether or not the student 
elected to enter the market (cf. Wambsganss and Kennett 1995). 
The second representation positioned the student as the product 
of the market, and employers the real customers (cf. Sirvanci 1996). 
Typical was the submission that noted the ‘‘increase in the demand 
 
 
for skilled and educated workers from employers’’ (Submission 20, 
2014, p. 14) or those that spoke of ‘employer demand’ (cf. 
Submission 46, 2014). The third representation synthesised the two 
approaches, by observing that students were both consumers of 
and transformed by the educational experience (cf. Lovelock and 
Rothschild 1980; Hoffman and Kretovics 2004). Mutual benefit was 
promoted, in the sense that ‘‘Our students need the opportunity to 
receive the best education, and employers need those who are 
ready for the job’’ (Submission 42, 2014, p. 2). Again however, 
across all three representations the constructs of student-as-
customer was suppressed. In the more than 160 submissions made 
to the Senate, the word ‘‘market’’ appeared 792 times, whilst the 
word ‘‘customer’’ appeared only ten times. 
 
 
Engendering the behaviours of a customer in higher 
education students 
 
In addition to reducing public expenditure in higher education, a 
key aim of the 2014 reforms was to encourage greater competition 
between institutions to ‘‘deliver greater choice and higher quality 
courses for students (Pyne 2014b, p. 1). However it is easier to 
make the rhetorical link between choice and diversity than it is to 
demonstrate it (cf. Gorard 1997). In an environment where the 
price of higher education is largely controlled, student choice is 
driven by factors other than cost. Similar with other countries, an 
Australian higher education qualification is an associative good, 
meaning that students choose their university based in part of the 
capital (social, economic, cultural) of its alumni (Hansmann 1999). 
However associative goods do not encourage price diversity, 
especially in supply-controlled markets, as once the top-ranked 
university has secured all the best students and is charging them a 
monopoly price the second-best university has every incentive to 
charge its students the same price without fear of losing students to 
the best institution and so on down the line (Dill 2011). This was 
demonstrated in Australia in 2004, when the government allowed 
universities to vary fees by up to 25 % above the previously 
 
 
prescribed limit. The legislative change was intended to introduce 
price diversity into the system; instead most universities opted for 
the extra 25 % straight away, with the handful of diverging 
universities raising their fees to the maximum student contribution 
rate within only a few years (National Union of Students 2013). A 
similar situation occurred in the UK when in 2010, MPs approved  
raising the cap on tuition fees from £3290 to a maximum £9000.1  
However the 2014 Australian higher education reforms contained 
two elements that had the potential for greater price differentiation 
than had occurred in previous cases. First, supply would continue to 
remain uncontrolled, allowing universities to increase or even 
decrease the number of student places in order to affect both price 
and demand. Second, across the sector there would be no 
maximum price limit to which institutions would feel pressured to 
set their price at, as it would function as a proxy for quality. The 
reforms would result in ‘‘[course] prices [moving] in both directions 
following deregulation and the prestigious university brands will 
find themselves going head-to-head with a raft of cheaper but 
equally high-quality competitors’’ (Pyne 2014c). Yet the response 
by many other stakeholders revealed that price diversity was more 
frequently understood as price uncertainty. Opponents to the 
reforms raised the spectre of an ‘‘increase in the cost of some 
university degrees to more than $100,000’’ (Submission 111, 2014, 
p. 3). A more accurate observation was: 
At  this  stage,  nobody  knows  what  level  deregulated  fees  
will  be  set  at. Estimated fees are not results of modelling: 
they are inputs into the models.  Estimates of ‘$100,000 
degrees’ are not produced by modelling: they are 
assumptions made before running models (Submission 46, 
2014, p. 28). 
When the Government was requested to release figures used to 
produce secret government modelling on university fees post-
deregulation it refused, with officials arguing their release could 
undermine ‘‘genuine price competition’’ and in any case ‘‘while 
                                                             
1 Fees rose overall to £6000, with an upper tier of £9000 if universities could 
demonstrate they were ensuring access for poorer students. 
 
 
presented as assumed facts and informed by departmental 
analysis and research, these figures were essentially invented by 
departmental officials for the purpose of providing material for 
analysis based on assumed patterns of behaviour’’ (Hurst 2015). 
Throughout the period in which the reforms were debated only 
one university released its indicative prices of its courses post-
deregulation, reinforcing the argument that the proposed reforms 
were creating ‘‘a toxic environment of uncertainty for students’’ 
(Submission 49, 2014, p. 1). 
Equally, there was uncertainty as to whether students would act 
as customers by displaying greater levels of price sensitivity, given 
the continuance of the ICLS component of HECS. Policy advocates 
argued that an ‘‘effective market [required] sophisticated, price—
aware customers’’ (Submission 26, 2014, p. 2). However one of the 
rationales for the implementation of the ICLS was to encourage 
increased participation particularly from students  from poorer 
backgrounds. It did so by shifting the cost of the student’s 
education away from a cash-constrained time to a later period of 
relative affluence. Prior research into the effect of HECS indicated it 
has had the desired effect of increasing access and participation to 
higher education and that the ICLS component was a contributing 
factor (cf. Chapman and Ryan 2005). Under the proposed reforms, 
some stakeholders, such as Swinburne University of Technology, 
feared the co-existence of fee-deregulation and HECS would result 
in fee increases being: 
Exacerbated by the design of [HECS], which ensures that 
students incur no costs for their tuition at the point of 
purchase. The fact that students can defer their payments for 
many years means that students can be less sensitive to price 
at the time they commence their studies (Submission 109, 
2014, p. 4). 
Others believed only disadvantaged students would display 
increased price sensitivity; such as those from lower socio-
economic backgrounds. The University of Melbourne Graduate 
Students Association believed: 
The institutions that will be most heavily affected by funding 
 
 
cuts are also those whose students would be least able to 
afford higher fees. Regional and outer metropolitan 
institutions have far higher percentages of students from low 
socio-economic status backgrounds, and these students are 
more likely to be sensitive to price increases (Submission 64, 
2014, p. 3). 
In turn, these various perceptions and concerns related to the rights 
of all students, as customers, to access the higher education 
market, which is discussed in the following section. 
 
Public citizens in a private market 
 
In a classical, capitalist market, goods are private in the sense that 
they are rivalrous and excludable, meaning provision of a good to 
one consumer denies its provision to another, and an individual 
can be denied access to a good; for example by not having enough 
money to pay for it. The reverse holds true for public goods. Prior to 
the 2014 reforms and in common with most developed nations, 
higher education in Australia was neither a wholly public nor 
wholly private good. Technically, the provision of an education to 
one student denied its provision to another as there were a finite 
number of student places. However the implementation of a 
demand- driven funding system meant that in practical terms this 
was not the case at the macro (i.e. sectoral) level. However higher 
education was also an associative good and this created prestige-
based sub-markets within the field. Within  these, the provision 
of a student place at a more desirable, elite university did have a 
more significant impact on other students seeking to access that 
same university. In terms of excludability, the existence of HECS and 
the ICLS meant that many more students could afford higher 
education at the point of entry and the evidence to date indicated 
that overall enrolments increased even as the proportional private 
investment cost rose (Chapman and Ryan 2005). Consequently 
education has been variously described as having a public good 
‘component’ (Sen 2000) or as a private good that is defined or 
understood as a  public one (Menashy 2009). Further, Marginson 
(2011a) unpacks the idea of higher education as a ‘thing’, observing 
 
 
it is actually a combination of various things. Thus, for example, the 
public functions of a university can be more readily found in the 
social and political effects it has on the wider community, with its 
tertiary qualifications offerings being increasingly understood in 
terms of their private economic enrichment. The provision of an ICLS 
such as HECS further problematises the public/private dichotomy, as 
it is viewed by organisations such as the OECD as being a private 
investment by the student but is underpinned by significant public 
investment, especially when the state forgoes the debt when the 
student earns less than a prescribed minimum. 
In accordance with Australia being a signatory to International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Government 
was obliged to demonstrate how its 2014 reforms would not 
impact on Article 13, in particular that ‘‘Higher education shall be 
made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every 
appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive 
introduction of free education’’ (UN Economic and Social Council 
1999). The Government argued its reforms ‘‘substantially expands 
access to higher education by extending the demand-driven system 
[resulting in] Commonwealth support for more than 80,000 
additional students each year by 2018’’ (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2014, p. 8). The impact of fee-deregulation was 
positioned by the Government as recalibrating the public–private 
investment in higher education from 60–40 to 50–50. The Minister 
for Education argued students were ‘‘currently paying 40 % of the 
cost, so we’re asking them to increase their contribution by 10 % to 
the 50 % level. I think that’s a fair deal…’’ (Pyne 2014d). In reality, 
due to various factors surrounding different subsidy levels for 
different courses, the average student contribution was expected  
to  increase  by  29 %  (Universities  Australia  2014).  Furthermore,  
the Minister’s statement assumed universities would only raise fees 
to compensate for the  cut  in  the  public  subsidy,  when  fee-
deregulation  would  encourage  many universities to go further, 
meaning the 50–50 representation was an inaccurate reflection of 
what prices might look like in a competitive market (Robinson 
2014). Whilst most public universities supported fee-deregulations, 
they did not support the  reduction  of  public  investment.  As  the  
Australian  Technology  Network universities argued, ‘‘Australia’s 
 
 
public universities were not established to make a profit for 
shareholders, nor do they exist to make a financial return for 
government. Rather, they exist to deliver a common good through 
the provision of teaching and research’’ (Submission 15, 2014, p. 3). 
These and many other submissions made the point that, in the 
words of one individual, ‘‘Education is a public good, like health 
care, roads, police and armed forces. The end user is not the student; 
it is the user of public goods like health care, transport and justice’’ 
(Submission 24, 2014, p. 1). The Government regularly adopted 
positions that attempted to straddle the public– private dichotomy. 
The Minister argued that ‘‘As a result of these reforms, access to 
higher education will be expanded… [for more students] these 
changes will support the right to higher education [author’s 
emphasis]’’ (Pyne 2014b, p. 6). However the same document 
acknowledged the ‘‘potential for some changes to lead to increased 
fees and costs for students’’ (Pyne 2014b, p. 6). This was justified 
by the fact that graduates would earn ‘‘75 % more over a lifetime 
than people without a university degree [or] $1 million more than 
people who don’t go to university’’ (Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation  2014); a claim that focussed on the private benefits 
accruing from education, as well as inferring an unfair impost 
through the application of an involuntary public contribution from 
citizens not realising this private benefit. Such exchanges revealed 
the multi-level nature of a higher education market. At the macro 
level, there was one market (i.e. ‘‘the students’’). At the meso level 
were groups of individuals representing a particular demographic 
(i.e. ‘‘some students’’). At the micro level there were only 
individuals (i.e. ‘‘a student’’). Classical market ideology focussed 
mostly on the macro and micros level; however higher education 
equity policy was mostly concentrated at the meso (group) level. 
Whilst altering the public–private investment balance was not 
necessarily anathematic to principles of access and participation, 
the associated removal of higher education targets for 







Since 1989, the introduction of neoliberal market ideology to the 
Australian higher education sector has been a process of iterative, 
pragmatic application. The aims of macro-policy reform have 
remained framed largely in terms of greater public benefit, through 
increased national productivity and greater individual access 
through the massification of higher education. The gradual 
recalibration of public– private investment has also been framed 
in terms of public benefit; that is, as a means of sharing the fruits 
of education more widely by supplementing the public investment 
with private. Under this rubric, the student is rarely explicated as 
a customer. This is in part recognition of the multiple benefits 
and benefactors of higher education, which tends away from 
identifying a strict, linear relationship between the institution and 
the individual. It is also an acknowledgement that even with the 
ever-increasing application of market forces, market efficiencies and 
market competition, the state remains largely in control of the 
market, by controlling the amount of supply to, and maximum cost 
for, its citizens. Even when supply becomes unrestricted, as was the 
case in Australia in 2012, the state retained control of the 
proportional private cost to the student. This frames the individual 
as much a recipient of social welfare as it does a customer using 
his/her finances to purchase a good for private benefit. 
Where the 2014 reforms differed was that unlike previous 
attempts to restructure the higher education sector, the state 
flagged its intention to forgo control of the market price. In turn, 
this created a strong perception that the student would be 
treated as a customer to a greater degree than ever before. 
Policy would now, potentially, constitute the student as a customer 
de jure, not de facto. Releasing the market price from state control 
would be a necessary step if at some point the intention is to 
shift higher education from a New Public Management model 
towards a full-blooded capitalist-market ideal. Marginson (2013) 
notes that this is an impossibility, in great part due to political 
limitations, and wonders at the bi- partisan persistence in this 
type of reform, even if those involved must be aware of the futility 
of their actions. The evidence from this study is that the inability 
to acknowledge, let alone comprehend, how the student functions 
 
 
as a customer in market reform can be held partly attributable for 
the most recent reform failure. Yet this is a discussion that is 
essential to the transformation of higher education, whether 
policymakers are for or against market reforms or for or against 
greater public expenditure. It is not possible to fully apprehend 
how a higher education market might function in the future if its 
customers are not equally apprehended. Higher education policy 
reform needs dialectical debate, not rhetorical positioning that 
either criticises market reform via perceiving the student-as-
customer construct as an ‘unfortunate’ one (Vuori 2013) or makes 
the student as invisible as possible so as to avoid such negative 
connotations. As Eagle and Brennan (2007, p. 56) observe, ‘‘The 
student-as-customer concept is neither wholly flawed, nor a 
panacea for the higher education system—it is something in 
between’’. 
Acknowledging the student as a customer of higher education 
has particular advantages, for all stakeholders, as it foregrounds the 
private investment made and reinforces higher education as a 
valuable resource in an environment where public funds must be 
secured as part of a zero-sum game. Furthermore, the 
representation of the state as a higher education customer 
reinforces a reality that a higher education construct of market-
customer will likely never be based solely economic considerations. 
Whilst governments might seek to reduce their economic investment 
in higher education it does not therefore follow that they seek to 
reduce its social dividend. Contemporary higher education policy 
is frequently characterised by increased accountability, often 
around issues of access and opportunity. This is not to say that the 
customer construct cannot be damaging to principles of higher 
education  equity;  it  does  however  mean  the  two  elements  
are  not  mutually exclusive. Ultimately, the intention is not to re-
create the student as a classical, capitalist-market student. This is 
both impossible and undesirable: impossible because Australian 
and related international covenants preclude any ability by the 
state to create a genuinely rivalrous and excludable market; and 
undesirable because these preclusions are a reflection of 
widespread, bi-partisan commitment to increasing higher 
 
 
education access and participation for all students. Rather, the 
goal should be to understand the unique and particular status of 
the student as a customer, which is one that by necessity must 
bridge the public/private nexus. It is at this interface that effective 
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